City University of New York (CUNY)

CUNY Academic Works
Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects

CUNY Graduate Center

9-2020

An Empire Among Empires: America's Relationship to "the Other"
in the Historiography of Empire
Lynne C. Goldhammer
The Graduate Center, City University of New York

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/3981
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu
This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY).
Contact: AcademicWorks@cuny.edu

AN EMPIRE AMONG EMPIRES:
AMERICA’S RELATIONSHIP TO “THE OTHER”
IN THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF EMPIRE

by

LYNNE GOLDHAMMER

A master’s thesis submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Liberal Studies in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, The City University of New York

2020

© 2020
Lynne Goldhammer
All Rights Reserved

ii

An Empire Among Empires: America’s Relationship to “the Other”
in the Historiography of Empire
by
Lynne Goldhammer

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Liberal
Studies in satisfaction of the thesis requirement for the degree of Master of Arts.

Date

David S. Reynolds
Thesis Advisor

Date

Elizabeth Macaulay-Lewis
Executive Officer

THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
iii

ABSTRACT
An Empire Among Empires: America’s Relationship to “the Other”
in the Historiography of Empire
by
Lynne Goldhammer

Advisor: David S. Reynolds

This paper outlines two different threads in the historiography of empires regarding their treatment
of “the other.” The first thread begins with the early Chinese empires, the Qin and Han, which used
diplomacy and tributes as well as repression to incorporate “others” under their imperial umbrellas.
This thread was then picked up and modified later by the Mongols and Mughals, both of which
showed a fair amount of flexibility and openness towards cultural difference. The second thread
begins with the Romans (the Republic and Empire), who were largely flexible and inclusive
towards “others” until the late Empire, when Christianity took over and Rome’s longstanding
practice of religious pluralism was replaced with monotheism. While the Romans were relatively
tolerant towards “others” for much of their existence, it was this later intolerance born out of
monotheism that became its legacy – and lesson – for future empires seeking to recreate Rome. The
Spanish and British Empires are examined in Rome’s wake, with each empire demonstrating a
decreasing openness to diversity and increased tendency towards racism. The final chapter puts the
United States in this second thread, arguing that this intolerance toward “the other” becomes
codified during the Revolutionary War as a way to solidify support for independence, with this
exclusive view of empire, particularly with regards to race, continuing in various forms throughout
the American Empire and into the present.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
In 1773 Benjamin Franklin wrote the satirical “Rules by Which a Great Empire May Be
Reduced to a Small One,” in which he outlined the steps an empire should take if it wants to lose
its standing in the world. In addition to recommending the abandonment of all principles of liberty
that might have once nurtured a revolution (“for such principles, after a revolution is thoroughly
established, are of no more use; they are odious and abominable”), Franklin advocated choosing
“broken gamesters or stockjobbers” as governors and “ignorant, wrong-headed and insolent” men
as judges as together these corrupt incompetents would serve to make the government “detestable.”
When the people sought redress for their grievances, Franklin suggested they be met with the
“utmost contempt” and “further oppression” in order to achieve the goal of “making them weary of
your government,” thus causing them to become “more disaffected, and at length desperate.”
Desperation achieved, Franklin advocated sending armies abroad under the auspices of “protecting
the inhabitants” but then going on the offensive instead in a way that demonstrated an empire’s “ill
will or ignorance,” further solidifying the belief that “you are no longer fit to govern.” As a
finishing touch, hand “great unconstitutional powers” to generals and free them “from the control
of even your own Civil Governors.”1
While Franklin was writing about the British Empire, many of his critiques appear
uncomfortably similar to the present state of affairs in the United States, a fact which is ironic not
only because America is often considered the end result of the British Empire’s bungling but more
pointedly because for much of America’s history, the U.S. has managed to evade the distinction of
being considered an empire at all. Even today, this question of America’s status as an empire or

Benjamin Franklin, “Rules by Which a Great Empire May Be Reduced to a Small One,” Norton Anthology of
American Literature: Beginnings to 1820, 9th Ed., ed. by Robert S. Levine (New York: W.W. Norton, 2017), 452-6.
1

1

merely a “superpower” continues to prompt debate. Take Cambridge historian A.G. Hopkins’
recent book American Empire: A Global History, which argues that the U.S could only be
considered an empire between the years of 1898 to 1945, claiming “it is hard to argue that the U.S.
created a continental empire in the nineteenth century. Characterizations of the polity need to take
account not only of intent but also of scale, and Native Americans represented only a tiny fraction
of the population.”2 (The U.S. swallowing over half of Mexico’s territory in 1848 goes
unmentioned here). Meanwhile, other historians like Thomas Bender point to the U.S. as merely a
different style of empire, one that was in contrast to the “composite” British empire, and it was this
distinction the U.S. often used to rationalize its “expansionist logic.” Bender cites Thomas
Jefferson’s concept of an “empire of liberty,” which rejected the European model of expansion in
favor of equality among new and old states as outlined in the Northwest Ordinance. While this
equality amongst states may seem like an improvement on European models, Bender shows that
this expansion “promised unlimited expansion to white settlers” and white settlers only, “thus
undermining any notion of Native American priority or legitimate presence.”3 Cutting out a
conquered indigenous population altogether was not the norm for empires, as most imperial
regimes had to navigate local elites and other intermediaries to maintain its grip. Still, while
nineteenth-century U.S. expansion maintained this distinction, in many other ways its westward
expansion was in line with that of other imperial powers.
Scholarly debates aside, Bender notes that “empire had been on the national agenda for
decades” before 1898 by Americans themselves, and there is ample evidence to support this.4 In
“New Wine in Old Skins? American Definitions of Empire and the Emergence of a New Concept,”

A.G. Hopkins, American Empire: A Global History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019), 237.
Thomas Bender, A Nation Among Nations: America’s Place in World History (New York: Hill & Wang, 2006), 105.
4 Ibid., 9.
2
3
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Norbert Kilian traces the changing colonial interpretations of the word “empire” from 1765 until
after Independence to determine how public opinion viewed the concept in relation to America’s
emerging place in the world. Kilian demonstrates how colonists went from believing themselves
part of the British Empire, to believing their local legislative assemblies on par with Parliament, to
predicting that one day America would replace the British metropole as the center of the Empire.
Kilian’s tracking of John Adams’ use of the term merits particular attention, as ‘empire’ moves
from being synonymous with “despotism” to finding a place within a republic as “an empire of
laws, and not of men,” thus reclaiming the word “for the republican ideology.”5 This reclaiming
could also take on religious connotations with men like Samuel Adams declaring that “Providence
will erect a mighty empire in America,” and Nathaniel Ames asserting in his Almanac, “The finger
of God points out a mighty empire to your sons.”6 Even poets like Philip Freneau and Hugh Henry
Breckinridge made references to America as the empire that “yet must rise” in their poem “The
Rising Glory of America,” which predicts that Britain’s sons will spread their “Dominion to the
north and south and west Far from th’Atlantic to the Pacific shores,”7 reflecting the early
underpinnings of Manifest Destiny. This idea of expansion as a noble act is seen as well in the final
stanza of Bishop Berkeley’s poem “On the Prospect of Planting Arts and Learning in America”
Westward the course of empire takes its way;
The first four Acts already past,
A fifth shall close the Drama with the Day;
Time’s noblest offspring is the last. 8

Norbert Kilian, “New Wine in Old Skins? American Definitions of Empire and the Emergence of a New Concept,”
Theories of Empire, 1400-1800, ed. by David Armitage (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 1998), 314.
6 Ibid., 316-7.
7 Philip Freneau, The Poems of Philip Freneau, vol. I, ed. Fred L. Pattlee (New York: Russell & Russell, 1963), 73. As
quoted in Ibid.
8 George Berkeley, The Works of George Berkeley, vol. IV (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1901), 365-66. As
quoted in Armitage, 316-7.
5
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While Kilian points out that many of these people were critical of empire in the British
sense of the word, it was believed America could be a new kind of empire, one that was unspoiled
by the past and thus could encompass territorial expansion, republican ideals, God’s chosen people,
and progress in the arts and sciences. Even George Washington claimed in the Circular to the
States: “The Foundation of our Empire was not laid in the gloomy age of Ignorance and
Superstition, but at an Epocha when the rights of mankind were better understood and more clearly
defined, than at any former period.”9
Still, the slippery relationship between America and empire continues to dog scholars
today, so much so that in 2019, historian Daniel Immerwahr felt the need to publish a book entitled
How to Hide an Empire: A Short History of the Greater United States, in which he reminds readers
“Empires might be hard to make out from the mainland, but from the sites of colonial rule
themselves, it’s impossible to miss.” In other words, if one could speak to a nineteenth-century
Cherokee or African American or Mexican, it’s unlikely there would be much debate as to
America’s status as an empire. As for contentions that America’s imperial status ended in 1945
(presumably at the moment of global decolonization), Immerwahr points to the roughly eight
hundred American military bases in over eighty countries as proof that the new style of empire,
which he and others have referred to as “pointillist,” is alive and well, adding that since 1945,
“U.S. armed forces have been deployed abroad for conflicts or potential conflicts 211 times in 67
countries. Call it peacekeeping if you want or call it imperialism. But clearly this is not a country
that has kept its hands to itself.”10 Alfred McCoy contends that many historians of American

Ibid., 319.
Daniel Immerwahr, How to Hide an Empire: A Short History of the Greater United States (London: Bodley Head,
2019), 15-19.
9

10
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foreign policy have continued to remain in denial about America’s place in the world, pointing out
that it was literary scholars specializing in cultural or postcolonial studies, not diplomatic
historians, who first began exploring America as an empire. 11
Ironically, today as America faces a steep decline in its world standing (already well in
progress before the appearance of Covid-19), many have been declaring the end of the “American
Empire,” an empire that few within its borders recognized during its rise, but nearly everyone
acknowledges in its fall. As with all declines, the causes given are varied. Historians like Andrew
Bacevich and David Hendrickson argue that a loss of values is to blame, even if they seem at odds
about which values have been lost. For Bacevich, our addiction to “unrestrained freedom” (in
markets, in war, in profits) has created a selfishness that precludes duty to one’s country and the
greater good, while Hendrickson sees America’s abandonment of individual liberty and its tradition
of liberalism as the proverbial straw that broke the camel’s back.12 Before his death in 2010,
political theorist Chalmers Johnson famously declared “A nation can be one or the other, a
democracy or an imperialist, but it can’t be both. If it sticks to imperialism, it will, like the old
Roman Republic, on which so much of our system was molded, lose its democracy to a domestic
dictatorship.”13
Johnson’s contention displays a thread that has long been a part of American
historiography; namely, the comparison of the American polity to ancient Rome. Indeed, a brief list

Alfred W. McCoy, In the Shadows of the American Century: The Rise and Decline of U.S. World Power (Chicago:
Haymarket Books, 2017), 20. McCoy spends the better part of his book proving Immerwahr’s claims in detail.
12 Andrew Bacevich, The Age of Illusions: How America Squandered Its Cold War Victory (New York: Metropolitan
Books, 2020), and David C. Hendrickson, Republic in Peril: American Empire and the Liberal Tradition (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2018).
13 Chalmers Johnson interviewed by Amy Goodman on Democracy Now 11/22/2010.
https://www.democracynow.org/2010/11/22/chalmers_johnson_1931_2010_on_the
Also see Chalmers Johnson, Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire (New York: Henry Holt
Books, 2004). And Nemesis: The Last Days of the American Republic (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006). And
Dismantling the Empire: America’s Last Best Hope (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2010).
11
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of the Roman Republic’s transition into empire by historian Edward J. Watts is sobering: A series
of political and economic crises brought Rome’s first emperor, Augustus, into power. But as
plagues and floods hit Rome, chaos, food shortages and mass rioting ensued. Fighting in the senate,
long since corrupted by years of war (external and internecine), threatened to throw the empire into
further anarchy. In response, Augustus initiated a brutal takedown of all his critics, prompting more
bloodshed and instability. Many thought the chaos would push Rome back into the familiar
territory of a republic, but instead, it played upon people’s fears and Augustus’s one-man rule
became the stabilizing force to which people clung. Watts ends with, “Order came to chaos only
when freedom was exchanged for fear.”14
Rome was but one in approximately seventy empires, however, and while many
comparisons have been drawn between the two republics/empires, very little has been written about
where America figures in the historiography of empire in general. Naturally, part of this omission
comes from the ongoing disagreements about America’s imperial status. Perhaps even more at
play, though, is America’s own belief in its exceptionalism, an idea that by definition doesn’t admit
to the existence of equivalents, thus conveniently making comparisons to others superfluous.
Historian William Appleman Williams once referred to America’s tendency towards this myopia as
the country’s “grand illusion,” the “charming belief that the United States could reap the rewards of
empire without paying the costs of empire and without admitting that it was an empire.”15 Thomas

Edward J. Watts, Mortal Republic: How Rome Fell into Tyranny (New York: Basic Books, 2018), 5-7. While Watts
writes exclusively about Rome, many critics used the book as an opportunity to draw lessons for America. See Yascha
Mounk, “What the Fall of the Roman Republic Can Teach Us About America,” The New York Times, Dec. 24, 2018
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/24/books/review/edward-j-watts-mortal-republic.html. And Sean Illing, “What
America Can Learn from the Fall of the Roman Empire,” Vox, Mar. 3, 2019
https://www.vox.com/2019/1/1/18139787/rome-decline-america-edward-watts-mortal-republic. And Briefly Noted,
The New Yorker, January 14, 2019 https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/01/21/mortal-republic-theindispensable-composers-those-who-knew-and-my-sister-the-serial-killer. To name just a few.
15 William Appleman Williams, Empire as a Way of Life (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 170. Quoted in
McCoy, In the Shadows, 39.
14
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Bender has outlined how the first generation of American historians were better trained in world
history than later Cold War historians, who fell back on an American exceptionalism that allowed
them to create a far more “self-enclosed” historical narrative. For these later historians, Frederick
Jackson Turner’s assertion, “No country can be understood without taking into account of all the
past….for local history can only be understood in the light of the history of the world,” was an idea
whose time had come and gone. 16
It is my intention to shift the focus from self-enclosure to self-exposure and begin an
examination of America’s place within the greater historiography of empire. To that end, the
methodology used here will be interpretive rather than archival, and as such, the work presented
should be viewed as a type of interpretive essay. My examination necessitates that I enter into
fields well outside my specialty area in ways that will expose my own weaknesses as an American
Studies scholar who has largely been limited in her studies to national parameters and perspectives.
In this way, both the U.S. and I will go through a similar process of self-exposure, hopefully with
the goal of taking the blinders off and considering a more global view of America’s place in the
world. By shifting this focus, I believe certain ideas which appear true within a national context
may be proven quite untrue within a global one.
As so much of the analysis surrounding empire focuses on military or economic
considerations, I have chosen instead to focus my inquiry on the question of how certain empires
dealt with the different peoples it drew into its borders (i.e., “the other”).17 Building on Jane

Frederick Jackson Turner, “The Significance of the Frontier in American History,” in Ray Allen Billington, ed.
Frontier and Section: Selected Essays of Frederick Jackson Turner (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1961), 20-21.
Quoted in Bender, 12.
17 See Paul Kennedy’s still relevant The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from
1500 to 2000 (New York: Vintage, 2000) –as the title suggests, the analysis is heavily skewed towards military
considerations. Or Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence: China, Europe and the Making of the World Economy
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), which argues in a vein similar to Jared Diamond, that Europe’s access to
coal and trade with a “New World” gave it a competitive edge over China. For a similar geographical take on why
16
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Burbank’s and Frederick Cooper’s contention that China and Rome “became long-lasting reference
points for later empire builders,” my study will begin with a discussion of the two different
approaches to “the other” established by ancient China and Rome before briefly cataloging how
these approaches were then picked up by subsequent empires. 18 While it would be disingenuous to
suggest that every empire followed a path established by Rome or China, two tendencies did
emerge, both of which I plan to outline before moving on to a discussion of where America fits in
to this particular historiography.
As already discussed, the term “empire” has been the source of much disagreement and
confusion. For my purposes, I will be using Alfred McCoy’s definition of “empire:”
Empire is not an epithet but a form of global governance in which a dominant
power exercises control over the destinies of others, either through direct
territorial rule (colonies) or indirect influence (military, economic, and
cultural).19
McCoy’s assertion that “empire” is not a pejorative term is important.20 While today the word
provokes all sorts of negative connotations, its use here will strive to maintain a neutrality that will
hopefully not be tainted by how certain empires themselves have behaved throughout history. The
more recent concept of “nation-state” has also developed a checkered image, particularly amongst
American Studies scholars, but it needs to be acknowledged that for most of history, most of the
world’s inhabitants have lived under an empire, not a nation-state. Moreover, as we will see, it is
possible that for many, empire provided a degree of protection and social standing that was
challenged and even revoked under ideas of citizenship and nation-states.

great powers rise and fall, see Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies (New York: W.
W. Norton & Company, 1997).
18 Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2010), 4.
19 McCoy, 40.
20 This view is also mirrored by Burbank and Cooper in Empires in World History, p. 8-12.
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CHAPTER TWO: CHINA AND ITS DESCENDANTS
The first recorded Chinese dynasty, the Shang, dates back to 1600 B.C. and lasted nearly
six hundred years before being replaced by the Zhou dynasty, which ruled from 1029 B.C. to 771
B.C.21 The Zhou established the concept of leaders having a “Mandate from Heaven” to rule, but
this Mandate was no free pass to reign, rather it set up moral guidelines for emperors to follow with
the caveat that when these guidelines were disregarded, chaos ensued and regime change became
necessary to restore balance. Contrary to Europe’s “divine right of kings,” emperors in China were
to be chosen on merit, not simply by blood or birthright, meaning men of low birth who
demonstrated the correct moral conduct and (more importantly) superior battle skills were able to
move up the ranks to the top. When the Zhou was attacked by northern ethnic groups, the dynasty
was forced to relocate east, pushing China into a period in which various states jockeyed for power
called The Warring States Period (475 B.C. – 221 B.C.). Just before this disintegration, China’s
most important philosopher, Confucius, died, but not before having written his thoughts on the
proper way for leaders and their followers to behave in a civilized society, no doubt a response to
the chaotic times in which he lived
Confucian ideas of proper moral conduct became the foundations for the early imperial era
that emerged after the Warring States Period. This imperial era included the Qin dynasty (221 B.C.
to 206 B.C.), credited with finally unifying the country (albeit brutally), and the Han dynasty (206
B.C. – 220 A.D.), often considered the cultured dynasty that swooped in to save China from the
Qin’s brutality.22 While the Qin’s reputation for ruthlessness appears somewhat deserved on the
surface, the claim that it was an uncultured dynasty is perhaps less accurate. The Qin cultivated

Scholars normally consider the Qin the first official empire – though this is still a matter of much debate. See Li
Feng, Bureaucracy and the State of Early China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), Chapter 7.
22 Burton Watson, Ssu-ma Ch’ien: Grand Historian of China (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), 18-24.
21
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literacy through the unification of various non-alphabetic scripts, though it is true that only works
sanctioning the Qin’s existence were available for people to read. More importantly, though, by
unifying all of the warring states (at least politically), the Qin also incorporated a large diversity of
peoples, normally associated with their particular region, into the empire. Whereas officially the
Qin put forth what could be considered draconian standardization methods, the reality was in fact
an empire that aimed for ‘similarity’ rather than ‘homogeneity’ with traits and characteristics of
locals frequently incorporated into the standardization project. In other words, policies publicly
promulgated by the Qin were subjected to a fair amount of nuance and negotiation on the ground;
for in the end, the ultimate goal of many empires, the Qin included, was “loyalty” not “likeness.”23
The Chinese had long had a habit of ascribing the characteristics of a particular
geographical region to the personality traits of its inhabitants, so a tribe or nomadic peoples would
be labeled cold or warm, honest or dishonest, fiery or passive, based on the characteristics
associated with their native topography and climate. For example, the Chu people (who would
eventually rise up and topple the Qin) were believed to have violent tempers because they hailed
from the warmer temperatures of the south, while nomadic inhabitants of the northwest like the
Qiang were considered stubborn and rebellious. In general, people of the south were associated
with yang (bright, sunny and hot), while peoples in the north were aligned with yin (shady, dark
and cold). Clearly, these categorizations rested on stereotyping; however, by labeling the groups
yin and yang the Chinese were also admitting the need for both to exist in order to maintain
balance.
While all of China’s inhabitants have retroactively become “Chinese” today, historian Mark
Edward Lewis notes this term is “anachronistic,” claiming that the peoples of that time would have

23

Burbank and Cooper, Empires in World History, 12.
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been known as the “Qin, Qi, Chu or by the name of one of the other Warring States.”24
Nevertheless, China’s habit of absorbing diverse groups of peoples hardly began with the Qin. In
fact, China was continually absorbing new peoples into its borders, not as equals, but neither as
cultures that needed to be eradicated or even changed. Slowly over time, China incorporated many
different cultures/peoples under the umbrella of “Chinese” once they proved they were able to
follow the proper “way.” With the Han, it became a given that this “Chinese” culture was superior,
yet regional cultures and traditions were often tolerated and even appreciated to some degree, as
long as proper taxes (and/or tributes) were paid, and order was maintained. According to Lewis, the
regional variations of newly incorporated peoples were “not an inconvenient fact of life but, rather,
became essential to an empire that justified itself by making just this kind of hierarchical
distinction – between the universal, superior culture of the imperial center and the limited,
particular cultures of regions and localities.” 25
Although the Qin dynasty collapsed within two decades, its unification of China became
both a model and a source of critique for future empires. The Han in particular publicly rebuked the
Qin while privately continuing with many of their practices and institutions. With regards to
conquered peoples, though, it was established practice under the Qin for the emperor to visit his
newly conquered lands to leave inscriptions celebrating his successes and to perform sacrifices or
give offerings to major regional gods, a practice that was modified and continued under the Han.26
The Qin also created a system of universal military service which incorporated commoners into the
state. Here, those who were in active service brought their local or regional customs with them,

Mark Edward Lewis, The Early Chinese Empires: Qin and Han (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), 2. It
is important to note that prior to the Han, the concept of a “China” was not normally used. More common was either
Huaxia or Tianxia, though neither had clear boundaries.
25 Lewis, 1-2. And Randolph B. Ford, Rome, China and the Barbarians: Ethnographic Traditions and the
Transformation of Empires (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 89-90.
26 Lewis, 90.
24
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helping to achieve a high degree of cultural integration. This also allowed for a fair amount of
social mobility as people were able to rise through the ranks in the army and government, often
incorporating their indigenous ideas about music, food, literature and religion into the
bureaucracy.27
The Han continued the practice of incorporating non-Chinese peoples as dependent states,
viewing this as the first step towards recruiting the warriors amongst the newly conquered peoples.
Lewis claims that generally “members of a dependent state continued to live according to their own
customs and under their traditional leaders.” Instead of trying to force foreign people to submit to
Han rule, those who were interested in moving up the ranks to become “inner” subjects could serve
in the Han government as laborers or soldiers against other nomads in Han military campaigns.
Major regional chieftains brought tribute to the Han court in the form of exotic local goods, while
minor chieftains were left alone. 28 The Han were obsessed with collecting exotic objects from
distant places as this was an indicator of the stretch and scope of a ruler’s power. In fact, Chinese
emperors measured their power by their ability to draw foreign peoples into China, and for this
reason, foreigners helped to “shape the policies of the Chinese state as well as many features of
Chinese civilization.” Lewis explains that “The very definition of a common ‘Chinese’ culture was
derived through a set of systematic oppositions with these alien groups, particularly the northern
nomads.”29
Given the sheer numbers of diverse peoples in the region, order was not always easy to

Ibid., 44-5.
Ibid., 148.
29 Ibid., 128. It is interesting to note that the Qin themselves were considered outsiders associated with non-Chinese
barbarians, and the archeological record shows that Qin nobility had cultural connections with the central plain states.
See Ibid., 39. Historians today now recognize a similar outsider status with the Zhou, who had Altaic and nomadic
origins. See Peter B. Golden, “Imperial Ideology and the Sources of Political Unity amongst the Pre-Cinggisid Nomads
of Western Eurasia,” AEMA, 2 (1982): p. 48.
27
28
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maintain, as there was a constant stream of nomadic tribes threatening to invade China’s northern
and western borders (and to a lesser degree, the southern frontier), the most formidable of which
was the Xiongnu tribe. Considered an empire itself, the Xiongnu spent several centuries battling for
dominance over other nomad tribes as well as over the Chinese. Ancient history is filled with
stories of the Chinese having to manage the various peoples within their empire and at its fringes,
though historians today contend that the political picture between Chinese states and alien peoples
was far more fluid than is often portrayed in histories of the time.30 In order to understand this
discrepancy, it is important to spend a minute discussing the role of the historian in ancient China,
in particular, the Grand Historian Sima Qian (aka Ssu-ma Ch’ien).
Following Confucius, Chinese historians were invested with the moral authority to not only
record the knowledge of the past but to interpret this knowledge in the dual role of both historian
and judge. Perhaps the most famous person to do this was the Prefect of the Grand Scribes of the
Han dynasty (aka the Grand Historian), Sima Qian, whose important Shih ji (aka Shi Chi) tells the
story of China’s ancient history up through the Han dynasty. According to sinologist Burton
Watson, Sima Qian saw his work like that of other major ancient historians: as a didactic tool “to
censure evil and encourage good.”31 East Asian scholar Nicola Di Cosmo concurs, adding that the
Grand Historian performed the function of investigating “both heavenly and human phenomena,
the sense that history changes according to ‘patterns,’ and the holistic or syncretic vision of an
intellectual pursuit.”32 Consequently, accuracy was not always the point of historical writings at
this time, and for that reason Sima Qian’s work is sometimes more helpful as a cultural artifact of

Nicola Di Cosmo, Ancient China and Its Enemies: The Rise of Nomadic Power in East Asian History (Cambridge:
University of Cambridge Press, 2002), ch. 4. In fact, Di Cosmo argues that even the name Xiongnu incorporated other
peoples who had also been absorbed by the tribe.
31 Burton Watson, Ssu-ma Ch’ien, viii.
32 Di Cosmo, 263. For more on the historian’s role in the Han dynasty, see Di Cosmo, 256-258.
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the period than as a reliable historical record. 33 Still, the Shih ji remains enormously influential in
how the Chinese view their history, and it has left important clues as to how the ancient Chinese
viewed the various foreign peoples they encountered throughout the empire during the Imperial
Era.
While the Shih ji could slip into nonhistorical analysis, Sima Qian’s work should not be
viewed as a complete fabrication. In fact, the Grand Historian applied empirical methods to
describe details such as the lifestyle, history and ethnography of various nomadic tribes, with
which he certainly had firsthand knowledge. However, while noting the usual factors of geography,
economy, climate and local customs of the various peoples, Sima Qian was curiously silent about
any physical or linguistic differences between foreigners and the Chinese, leaving Watson to
conclude that either there weren’t any significant differences (highly unlikely given the incredible
diversity of peoples in Central Asia at this time) or more likely, that “the Chinese didn’t consider
such differences to be of any great significance.”34 This absence is also noted by Randolph Ford,
who claimed that unlike Greco-Roman texts, “There is little evidence of what might be termed
racial distinctions in classical Chinese thought,” an observation which will be discussed more
later.35
Nevertheless, Sima Qian also moved into metaphysical realms in an attempt to deal with
more cosmological concerns, and it is this aspect that is of particular interest here. Di Cosmo has
been fundamental in outlining how Sima Qian’s work became an important integrational tool that

It’s worth noting that as the official historian under Emperor Wu, Ch’ien wrote scathing criticisms of the Emperor’s
attempts to extract money to support his foreign wars, critiques that were punished with forced castration. Burton
argues that since Ch’ien had already begun working on Shih ji when he was castrated, his bitterness was not the
primary motive for his writing the work. Moreover, the work was originally started by Ch’ien’s father, Ss-ma T’an, and
Ch’ien picked up where his father left off. Ibid., 33-4.
34 Watson, Ssu-ma Ch’ien: Grand Historian of China, 8-10.
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composed a genealogy for certain nomadic peoples like the Xiongnu in order to make them “a
legitimate component of Chinese history from the beginning” and therefore “part of the family.”36
In fact, the Shih ji has an entire chapter dedicated to the Xiongnu, mixing historical events with
attempts to establish a kinship link between the northern tribe and the Chinese, as can be seen in
the opening sentence from chapter 110, “The ancestor of the Xiongnu was a descendant of the
rulers of the Xia dynasty, named Chunwei”37 The referenced Xia dynasty is largely considered a
semi-mythical dynasty set before the Shang, while Chunwei remains an unknown ruler, most likely
one of the countless mythical sage rulers the Chinese refer back to in their ancient texts. Di Cosmo
argues that this constructed kinship connection between mythical rulers and these northern nomads
allowed the Chinese to declaw the power of the Xiongnu, making them less threatening while at the
same time establishing a firm basis for further investigation of their ways. 38 While creating lineage
connections between mythical kings and foreign peoples was already an established tradition at this
time, Di Cosmo asserts that Sima Qian was the first to construct a narrative of the northern nomads
specifically for such a purpose, and his work became “the model for representations of northern
peoples and Inner Asian states in the subsequent Chinese historical literature.” 39
Sima Qian’s narrative about the Xiongnu served another purpose as well: namely, to
generate a causal relationship that frequently eschewed historical accuracy in order to promulgate a
moral critique. In chapter 28 of the Shih ji, Sima Qian describes Emperor Wen’s shortcomings,
claiming that
…Emperor Wen lost interest in changing the calendar and the colour of the
Di Cosmo, 300.
Sima Qian. Records of the Grand Historian by Sima Qian, Vol. 2, trans. Burton Watson (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1971), 129. It should be noted that the Xia dynasty is largely viewed as mythical by historians. See
Victor H. Mair, “Was There a Xia Dynasty?” Sino-Platonic Papers, No. 238, May 2013: p. 1-38. http://sinoplatonic.org/complete/spp238_xia_dynasty_china.pdf
38 Di Cosmo, 298.
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vestments and in matters concerning the spirits. He ordered his sacrificial officials
to see to the upkeep of the temples and altars of the Five Emperors north of the
Wei River and at Long Gate and to perform ceremonies at the proper seasons, but
he no longer visited them.
The following year the Xiongnu several times invaded the border and troops were
raised to guard against further incursions. During the last years of his reign the
harvests were not plentiful. 40
As Di Cosmo points out, by placing Emperor Wen’s disregard of his duties alongside the Xiongnu
invasion and a bad harvest, Sima Qian implies a causational relationship between the Emperor’s
poor conduct and the negative consequences of that conduct. 41 Obviously this is an ideological
connection under the pretense of historical causation, but it is also a good reminder of the fate an
emperor would incur if he moved away from the principles of the Mandate from Heaven. Sima
Qian asserted that being charitable was the key to enduring local power, so it was best to establish a
framework that reduced inequality between wealthy families and the poor, for not only did this set
a good moral example, it helped to establish emotional links between the haves and the have-nots.42
Building on this idea, Han scholar Jia Yi claimed, “One who conquers the lands of others, places
priority on deceit and force, but one who brings peace and stability honors obedience to
authority.”43 In other words, keeping the peace was a sign that an emperor was the proper possessor
of the Mandate, while allowing states to devolve into war was a sign that the empire was out of
balance and that regime change might be in order. To keep the peace, emperors had to find
diplomatic ways of dealing with foreign peoples both inside and outside their borders because a
failure to do so could signal the beginning of the end of an emperor’s Mandate. This did not mean
that violence wasn’t used, just that it was only one tactic in a bag also containing diplomatic
options, for an overreliance on force could spell the end of a ruler’s reign.

Records of the Grand Historian, 24.
Di Cosmo, 310.
42 Lewis, 123.
43 Quoted in Ibid., 71.
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Unlike the Roman Empire, which fell and never recovered, the Chinese Empire continued
to rise and fall for many centuries. China’s ability to continually get back onto its feet after periods
of turmoil and decline has been attributed to many factors, but certainly two worth noting were the
Empire’s flexibility towards non-Chinese peoples (which admittedly did not always translate to
favorable treatment) and its embrace of diplomacy (as long as proper submission was displayed).44
These tendencies were rooted both in Confucianism as well as in nomadic cultures, so having to
deal with challenging nomad empires like the Xiongnu often reinforced ideas already present in
Chinese ideology. Indeed, when Chinggis Qan led the Mongols across Central Asia in the early
thirteenth century, once the bloodshed settled, the Great Khan and his successors combined
Chinese and nomadic practices (largely looking to the Xiongnu) to build the world’s largest
contiguous empire, which at its peak united three civilizations under its rule (the Chinese, the
Islamic, and the hinterlands of the Byzantine) with a land mass stretching from Korea all the way
to Hungary.45 Just for comparison, it took Rome four centuries to accomplish what the Mongols did
in seven decades.
Thanks to their nomadic lifestyle, the Mongols had developed formidable military skills,
superior horsemanship, and a keen ability to adapt to a variety of circumstances. This meant that
after an invasion, the Mongols were able to switch gears from conquering via brute force to ruling
through more diplomatic methods (though brute force remained an option). Realizing that a
nomadic culture was limited in its administrative skills, the Mongols took advantage of the skills of
sedentary locals to fill positions of bureaucracy.46 Foreigners without local political ties were used
Other factors included China’s lack of a geographical center city like Rome; its forced interactions with nomads,
which provoked exploration and innovation; and how the Chinese managed their elites. See Burbank and Cooper, 5659.
45 Peter B. Golden argues that the Mongols based their imperial ideas on both the Chinese and the Xiongnu. See
Golden, “Imperial Ideology” p. 48.
46 One of the common complaints the Han dynasty had about the former Qin was that the Qin didn’t realize they had to
switch gears from conquering (and brutality) to ruling (and diplomacy). It seems possible the Mongols learned this
44
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as intermediaries and then circulated around the empire to prevent anyone from building too strong
a tie to any local region at the expense of loyalty to the imperial regime. While the Chinese had a
tendency to use foreign peoples in its army, the Mongols placed only Mongols in its military while
systematically filling its imperial bureaucracy with peoples of different ethnic, communal and
linguistic backgrounds, all working side-by-side.47 Even the lowest of these officials were given
opportunities to be promoted to high positions in the government and Mongol court, with the hopes
that offering opportunities for advancement would solidify a local’s loyalty to the Mongolian
regime.48
Beyond the various ethnic, cultural and linguistic differences, the number of religions under
the Mongol umbrella was impressive: Zoroastrians, Jews, Christians (Nestorian and Orthodox),
Muslims (Sunni and Shia), Manicheans, Tibetan Buddhists, to name just a few. Westerners who
visited the empire were struck by the Mongols’ tolerance of other faiths, with Marco Polo
remarking, “These Tartars do not care what God is worshipped in their lands. If only all are faithful
to the lord Kaan, and quite obedient, and give therefore of the appointed tribute, and justice is well
kept, thou mayest do what pleaseth thee with thy soul.” Even the Dominican friar and diplomat
Simon of Saint Quentin wrote of the Mongols
They allow Christian religious observances and those of every sect whatsoever,
and worship by men of every kind to be practiced amongst them in safety and
freedom, and wherever they hold power, moreover, they do not bother about the
customs of anyone whatsoever, provided they are given service just as they
command. 49

lesson from this well-known critique of the Qin. See Lewis 71-2.
47 The Mongols’ policy of filling bureaucracies with locals was not followed in the Yuan dynasty, as China’s welldeveloped bureaucracy was considered a threat to Mongol power. Some have argued that being expelled from the Yuan
bureaucracy led the Chinese elite to pursue arts and literature instead. See Burbank and Cooper, 108.
48 Thomas T. Allsen, Culture and Conquest in Mongol Eurasia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 5-7.
49 Both quoted in Peter Jackson, “The Mongols and the Faith of the Conquered,” Mongols, Turks, and Others:
Eurasian Nomads in a Sedentary World, eds. Reuven Amitai and Michal Biran (Leiden: Brill, 2005), p. 259. Jackson
does specify that when local traditions got in the way of Mongol traditions or rule, the response was far less tolerant.
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The Mongols followed a Shamanism that was itself an amalgam of various ideologies.
Traditionally Shamanism focused on real life spiritual matters like illness and didn’t concern itself
with dictating morality or questions concerning the afterlife. As a result, the Mongols had little
problem establishing relations with the various religious communities throughout the empire,
mostly as a strategic move and an expression of their realpolitik practices. According to traditional
Mongol beliefs, it was best to honor the rituals of all religions in order to avoid offending spirits
and invoking supernatural retaliation. In their minds, remaining open to any religious practice
might help them fulfill their immediate needs, and this overrode any interest in propagating a
particular doctrine regarding questions like salvation or damnation. Consequently, the Mongols did
not try to force their language or Shamanic religion on their subjects, and instead largely left the
indigenous populations to worship and live according to their own customs as long as the Empire
remained united. Curiously, the Mongols presided over debates between representatives of
different faiths, either as an intellectual exercise for a leader considering conversion or as a form of
public entertainment.50 In a nod to Sima Qian, the Mongols also constructed a mythical history of
the early Turks, Khitans and other steppe and forest peoples in order to appropriate and integrate
them into the Mongols’ own origin myths. 51 Also like the Chinese, the Mongols had their own
version of the Mandate from Heaven, in this case a religious-based ideology of conquest known as
Tenggerism, which claimed that Chinggis Khan and his successors had been given the Heavengranted power to rule the earth. Unlike a traditional religion, though, there was no ability to convert
into Tenggerism, you were either born into the Chinggisid line or you weren’t.52

Peter Jackson suggests these public debates might have been the Mongol version of the gladiator shows in Rome.
See Jackson, 253-4.
51 This is to be found in the only Mongolian narrative source handed down to us from the 13 th century, The Secret
History of the Mongols. See Peter Jackson, “The Mongols and the Faith of the Conquered,” p. 254.
52 Timothy May, The Mongol Conquests in World History, (London: Reaktion Books, 2012), 174.
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Once Chinggis Khan died in 1227, the Empire broke up into four khanates, the Yuan
(China), the Chagatai (Central Asia), the Ilkhanate (Persia) and the Golden Horde (Russia), all still
under some form of Chinggisid rule. Each khanate adopted a world religion, mostly to ingratiate
itself with the local population, with three of the four khanates choosing Islam, while Mongol
China adopted Tibetan Buddhism. Despite numerous attempts by Pope Innocent IV and Catholic
missionaries, Christianity, with its vows of poverty and chastity and intolerant view of nonWestern cultures, never made inroads with the trade-based Mongols. Latin Europeans at this point
had had little contact with other cultures and had not yet developed the intercultural
communication skills necessary to manage trade with a vast diversity of peoples. Moreover, Islam
was more appealing than Christianity for many because converts didn’t have to give up their ethnic
affiliation or change their way of life when they converted.53
One tangential area concerning the Mongols’ relations with “the other” deals with the
interesting role of Mongolian women in politics. Nomadic societies tend to be more egalitarian
than sedentary cultures, so it isn’t surprising that women played a fairly prominent role in
Mongolian public life. In fact, much to the shock and dismay of many Christian, Muslim and
Confucian travelers, it was common to see Mongolian women running and participating in political
and military councils known as quriltais. Chinggisid princesses were also involved in the
administration of their own appanage while queens (khatuns) openly gave advice to their husbands,
unlike in Islamic states which only allowed women to be involved privately and from within the
harem.54 As the Mongol Empire disintegrated and diffused itself into more sedentary cultures,
women began to lose these freedoms, though for the empires that continued in the Mongol
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tradition, women were able to retain this power, and in some cases, increase it.
One of the clearest examples of this increase in women’s power occurred in India’s Mughal
Empire, a cousin of the Mongols (“Mughal” is the Persian/Arabic word for Mongol). Women
under the Mughals could often become their tribe’s ambassador or representative to the court if
they married a Mughal prince. Although concubines existed, wives were important members of the
state since only legitimate heirs had any claims to the throne. However, if a wife was unable to
produce an heir, she could still play an active role in court life, a tradition handed down from the
Mongols. This was in contrast to the Ottoman Empire, where concubines were the preferred
method of producing an heir. Also, unlike the Mongol/Mughal tradition, women under the
Ottomans were prohibited from playing a political role in the public domain and had to resign
themselves to machinations behind the scenes. 55
Founded in 1526 by Babur (b. Zahir ud-Din Muhammad), a descendant of the dual legacies
of the Timurid and Chinggisid traditions, the Mughals ruled northern India off and on from the
early sixteenth century until the Sepoy Rebellion of 1857, when the British officially took over
from the flailing East India Company. 56 Famous for their tolerance of not only women but also of
people from other faiths, the Mughals were (largely Sunni) Muslims that ruled as a minority over a
vast non-Muslim population. Under these circumstances ruling by force seemed unwise, so to reign
effectively and peacefully, the Mughals adopted an ideology of compromise, articulating the
importance of “peace toward all” and creating a social equilibrium borrowed from older Persian
and Central Asian treaties. In this compromise, the Mughal ruler would take on non-Muslim
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attributes and practices while at the same time adopting the Persian culture and language for the
elite.57
Borrowing from the Mongols in their administrative tactics, the Mughals circulated its elite
bureaucrats to various parts of the Empire, a system that co-existed with the practice of using local
magnates called “zamindars” to collect taxes. While forced conversions were common in Christian
lands, the Mughals allowed those wanting to rise in the ranks the ability to learn Persian rather than
converting to Islam, a simple option that was unheard of in contemporary empires like the
Habsburgs or even the more tolerant Ottomans.58 In fact, Sanjay Subrahmanyam argues the reason
the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires broke up into several competing states while India remained
largely whole was attributed to the Mughals’ ability to manage regional diversity as well as
religious and denominational differences. That while the Ottomans believed in autonomy for nonMuslims, the Mughals practiced incorporating “the other,” all while compromising with local and
regional elites.59
The most famous of the Mughal rulers, Akbar (b. Abu’l-Fath Jalal-ud-din Muhammad
Akbar), was well-known for his tolerance, viewing each religion as interdependent parts of the
socio-political system. Raised Muslim, Akbar condemned the “slavish following” of others and
believed that one should not “submit to any human being as a moral and intellectual authority.”
Given Muhammad’s place in Islam, this thinking bordered on blasphemy for Muslims, a fact which
did not go unnoticed. This was no doubt intentional, though, as Akbar sought to eradicate Muslim
privileges in a strategy to put imperial values in place of tribal ones (a tactic also borrowed from
the Chinese). To do this, he banned religious discrimination, forced conversions, and
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discriminatory poll taxes. He also allowed many Hindus to rise to high positions and issued what
he referred to as the “infallibility decree” in an effort to unify Sunni and Shia Muslims.
Controversial, this decree declared Akbar the ultimate authority in religious matters, meaning not
that he was divine, but that he could decide which of the Mujahids’ interpretations of the law and
religious custom were correct. For Akbar, it was more important for a ruler to achieve social accord
than to enforce Sharia, so the abolition of religious discord became an essential part of the
emperor’s role.60
Harbans Mukhia makes clear, however, that the Mughals were not considered “foreigners
ruling over an alien land,” as he claims that this is a more recent idea hoisted back onto the ancient
and medieval world, both of which viewed conquest as “its own legitimation.” With modern
colonialism, though, the meaning of conquest has been altered to mean “governance of land and its
people, on behalf of, and primarily for the economic benefit of a community of people inhabiting a
far-off land.” Mukhia sees this newer way of ruling to be in stark contrast to the medieval world
“when the visitor either returned home after taking such plunder with him as he could gather after a
battle or two, or settled down in a vanquished land, submerging his and his group’s identity in it to
become inseparable from it.”61 To see how modern colonialism shifted ancient and medieval ideas
of empire, we need to turn to Rome and its descendants.
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CHAPTER 3: ROME AND ITS LEGACY
Rome was a monarchy before becoming a republic in 509 BC and then an empire in 27
BC., when Augustus declared himself Principate after a long period of civil war. There are many
misconceptions about Rome as a republic vs. Rome as an empire, as it is often assumed that
anything worth emulating came out of the former with anything objectionable emerging out of the
latter. Yet the reality is more complicated. As a republic, Rome spent a fair amount of its existence
in a quasi-state of war, as a great deal of Rome’s territorial conquests occurred under the Republic.
While expansion continued under the Empire, ironically, the Empire also set off two centuries of
relative stability often referred to as the Pax Romana. A hundred years later, Constantine (r. 324337 AD) shifted the capital east to Constantinople, leading to an eventual split in the Empire in 395
AD between the Western Roman Empire, centered in Rome, and the Eastern Roman Empire, set in
Constantinople. With the emperor out of Rome, the city fell into disarray and by 476 AD, the
Western Empire had collapsed. The Eastern Empire (today referred to as the Byzantine Empire)
fared much better, abandoning Catholicism for Orthodox Christianity and Latin for Greek,
ultimately building a stable and diverse imperial regime that lasted until the Ottomans invaded in
1453.
When people talk about ancient Rome, however, it is not always clear whether they are
referring to the Republic or the Empire. For my purposes, what happened when is less important
than the legacy that Rome left behind for subsequent empires. As I will show, the Romans were
remarkably open to “others,” allowing for a flexibility of identity that was unique in its time.
However, this inclusivity has frequently been cited as the reason behind Rome’s eventual “fall,”
and as a result, the lessons taken from Rome by subsequent empires have often been to limit
inclusivity. This is curious given that Rome was at its strongest when it was actively incorporating
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“others,” a practice that was largely ended in the fourth century after Christianity was declared the
official religion. Rome’s legacy, then, has not been that of its earlier centuries of (relative)
tolerance but rather of its later monotheism, often through force. The other lesson taken from Rome
was rule by an elite with the illusion of participation from those in the lower orders. Certainly,
there were ways to progress to the upper echelons of Roman society other than birth and wealth,
most notably through military service, but for the vast majority, political inclusion was not on the
table in any meaningful way. Nevertheless, unlike China or its descendant empires, Rome was
unique in that it offered citizenship to many under its authority.62 However, Rome also differed
from the Eastern empires in its large-scale use of slaves, a practice that only became more common
and less flexible in subsequent Western imperial regimes. Finally, as we will see, ancient Rome
engaged in early discussions of race, an issue that also grew in importance in succeeding empires,
particularly with regards to questions of who should and shouldn’t be included under the imperial
umbrella.
As in China, mythology played a significant role in the formation of Roman identity as well
as in the identity of “others.” In the early Republic, aspirational genealogies linked certain Roman
and Italian families to Greek mythological heroes like Aenas, and it was common at this time for
Romans to claim they descended from a Greek genos, ‘race.’63 In the late Republic/early Imperial
era, the mythology shifted to the Roman kingdom under Romulus, centering around two key
myths: the rape of the Sabine women and the less-cited story of Romulus’ asylum. In the former
tale, Romulus goes from town-to-town looking for willing women to come to Rome and help the
largely male city grow its population. Finding no volunteers, Romulus organizes a festival to attract
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young women to his city, and when the Sabine women show up, they become the unwilling
mothers to the future Roman population. To understand why Romulus was unable to find female
volunteers, though, we need to turn to Romulus’ asylum. Before the infamous rapes, Romulus
declares Rome a safe haven for fugitives, slaves and other undesirables in order to recruit citizens
for his fledgling city. This myth along with the Sabine rapes point to a Roman identity descended
from what the Greeks would often refer to as a citizen-body “rooted in criminality and the dregs of
society.”64 Perhaps more importantly, these foundation myths also point to the “mixed-race”
origins of Romans, setting up the possibility of social mobility and the incorporation of nonRomans into the citizenry, both of which have been cited throughout history as either the cause of
Rome’s success or ruin, depending on who is doing the judging. In contemporary times, however,
historian Emma Dench has noted that Romulus’ asylum
..remains a largely forgotten myth, alternatively an unfortunate reminder of the
‘race-mixture’ of a Rome that was the paradigm of both the British empire and the
independent American state…This was, for some, not an attractive model for
either America before the Civil Rights movement nor for essentially ‘racially’
exclusive European empires. Instead, ‘race-mixture’ and immigration were seen
as factors that contributed directly to Roman ‘decline.’65
Regardless of contemporary interpretations, Romans themselves largely viewed their mixed
heritage (mythological or otherwise) with a fair amount of pride. Admittedly, they had the
unenviable job of having to write themselves into the history of a world dominated by the Greeks,
so part of the job for Romans was to define themselves as masters of Greek culture while
producing a separate and estimable culture of their own. According to Dench, the Romans selfconsciously saw themselves as a “practical” people in contrast to the “merely theoretical” Greeks,

Emma Dench, Romulus’ Asylum: Roman Identities from the Age of Alexander to the Age of Hadrian (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2005), 93.
65 Ibid., 5-6.
64

26

and this could be seen in how they viewed “the other.”66 In his Annals, Tacitus has Claudius
attribute Rome’s success to the practice of enfranchising conquered peoples, in marked contrast to
the ruinous policy of Greece, claiming,
What else proved fatal to Lacedaemon and Athens, in spite of their power in arms,
but their policy of holding the conquered aloof as alien-born? But the sagacity of
our own founder Romulus was such that several times he fought and naturalized a
people in the course of the same day! 67
While it is true the Romans were more open to outsiders than the Greeks, it should be noted
that this openness was “only to privileged groups and on their own terms.”68 The Greeks posed a
tricky problem for the “Romanization” process, as assimilation was generally expected from
“others,” but the Greeks’ cultural heritage was deemed valuable so Romans had to construct an
identity that reflected a “privileged” relationship between Greeks and Romans. 69 For non-Greeks,
however, Conor Whately argues that the society Rome created was one based on the “melting pot:”
the idea that acculturation and assimilation were expected in order to (potentially) be included in
Roman society. Whately contrasts this with what he considers “multiculturalism:” a process by
which many different religious and cultural traditions coalesce to form one culture of co-existence,
a social form that appears closer to the Eastern empires, particularly the Mongol and Mughal
Empires, as well as later with the Ottomans and Russians.70
Still, by the end of the Republican era and into the early Imperial era, debates about Rome’s
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socially mobile and multi-ethnic nature heated up, with many lamenting “outsiders within” and
calling to curtail the manumission of slaves as well as the infiltration into the political sphere by
novi homines (“new men”), a term used to refer to men who made it into Roman political life
without any senatorial ancestors (Cicero being perhaps the most famous example). As many have
noted, this reevaluation of citizenry was no doubt the response to Rome’s Social War of 91-89 BC
with Italy, which resulted in the mass enfranchisement of Italians, and an expansion of rights that
continued under the Imperial regime and culminated in Caracalla’s near universal grant of
citizenship across the entire Empire in 212 AD.71 Still, as larger numbers of people far from Rome
gained citizenship, the question arises whether this status became progressively less important.
Dench argues that by the first century AD the “citizenship would have had its primary social and
juridical ‘meaning’ within the context of the local community,” adding that “the idea of gaining
some control within the Roman state, or even of exercising citizenship within the institutions of the
city of Rome, would by now be alien to most.”72 Historian A.N. Sherwin-White agrees with Dench,
claiming that the value and meaning of enfranchisement changed as it expanded, becoming “a
passive citizenship” that was “sought no longer for its political significance but as an honour out of
sentiment.”73 For this reason, Sherwin-White claims that Caracalla “was inspired by grand
boastfulness, rather than aiming at some material change in the circumstances of his time, when he
made the world Roman,” concluding that this gesture of universal enfranchisement ultimately
“stripped the citizenship of any specific content.”74
Citizenship aside, Roman identity could manifest itself in many different guises, with some
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identifying themselves with the city, while others saw themselves as a member of the princeps
community or as the emperor’s loyal client or a fictitious member of his household (the pater
patriae), and one could switch sides in any given moment depending on the exigencies of a
particular situation. In other words, how Roman-ness was manifested allowed for a large degree of
flexibility. More importantly, this identity was often constructed through a participatory process,
which gave the free inhabitants the illusion of sharing in the political process with the elite,
allowing for freemen to “actively bypass the feelings of subservience that such largesse would
otherwise have induced.” In this way, “the civic model was psychologically “useful” to the
imperial elite.”75 While many scholars have noted it is hard to determine how sincerely invested in
the Romanization process conquered peoples actually were, it was clear that there were more
benefits to giving into the process than there were to fighting it, though there were small pockets of
peoples that fought against Romanization, most notably the Gauls. 76 Nevertheless, Roman identity
engaged in a particular plurality which allowed “both the incorporation and transformation of other
peoples and cultures [to be] asserted simultaneously” even though there was a conspicuous tension
between the two.77
These scenarios all represented the best possible outcomes for conquered peoples, yet there
were other scenarios that were far less attractive: for example, falling into slavery. As pieces of
property lacking all rights and personhood, slaves found themselves at the very bottom of Rome’s
deeply hierarchical society. A slave’s quality of life could vary wildly, though, as slaves consigned
to work the mines were considerably worse off than those assigned to clerical tasks, and rural
slaves fared far worse than urban slaves. Regardless, by the fourth century BC, it was normal for
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those successful in warfare to enslave the defeated and captured, a practice that goes back at least
to Rome’s first codified body of law, the Twelve Tables (traditionally dated 451/450 BC), which
already assumed slavery to have been a longstanding practice in Rome’s history. While the scale of
slavery in Rome cannot be accurately determined, it is believed that in the early Republic, the
numbers were probably quite small. However, the habit of enslaving enemies increased
exponentially by the middle Republic as Rome went through its great expansion. With the conquest
of Italy, the Roman elite feasted on new opportunities for land acquisition, and this led to a
concomitant increase in the need for slaves to work the land. Small landholding peasants were
consequently replaced by slave labor, forcing angry peasants not consumed by the army into Rome,
where they became “a volatile populace open to the appeals of elite politicians willing to exploit
mass discontent for individual advancement.” 78 Meanwhile slave revolts started to become a source
of aggravation for Roman authorities. According to historian Keith Bradley, in the end it was “the
slave mode of production and the problems it generated [that] were responsible for the crisis of the
late second century, which in turn led to a century of civil war and the end of the Republic.”79
The move to empire, however, had little effect on the institution of slavery. While it is
believed the numbers continued to increase, what the numbers actually were is still an issue of
contention.80 Nevertheless, the possibility existed for manumission, and while this only occurred
for a small percentage of slaves, it was a practice that was fundamental to Roman ideology and
distinguished the Empire from other slave societies. Once manumitted, freedmen could go off and
lead lives of distinction and success, at times outdoing even the elite in terms of wealth.
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Unsurprisingly, the success of freedmen often generated feelings of rancor among the elite, who
disliked seeing the underclass rise too high. Unlike slave societies to come, slaves in Rome
comprised a variety of ethnic origins and languages, and since slaves and freedmen wore the same
clothes, they were often indistinguishable, making it notoriously difficult to detect slaves by their
appearance.81 Still, it is notable that while manumission might be restricted for periods of time to
appease elite grumblings, it was never fully eradicated, as it was understood that the possibility of
being freed was useful in discouraging widespread dissent and encouraging a strong work ethic.
Given the multi-ethnic nature of Rome, it has often been assumed that the Romans were not
“racist” because of the permeability of their citizenship. However, Emma Dench has noted that
modern scholars tend to focus on the ‘juridical’ aspect of citizenship, ignoring that Roman identity
also embraced a specific type of plurality which included “blood descent.” 82 She argues that while
we should not expect “Roman ideas of ‘race’ to work in the same way as those of the modern
Western world,” we should also not fall into “the assumption that the essentialist language of
descent and blood cannot have been taken seriously because of the ‘objectively’ multicultural and
mobile nature of Roman society.”83 Benjamin Isaac takes this one step further, arguing that the
Graeco-Roman world initiated a “proto-racism” that “served as a prototype for the modern racism
which developed in the eighteenth century,” though he clarifies that this proto-racism should not be
confused with the scientific racism of the nineteenth century.84 Indeed, there was a rise in the
interest of the exclusivity of blood or kin in second and first-century Roman debates surrounding
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Italian enfranchisement. Later, Suetonius claims in his biography of Augustus that the emperor
believed “it also of great importance to keep the people pure and unsullied by any taint of foreign
or servile blood, [so] he was most chary of conferring Roman citizenship and set a limit to
manumission.”85 Even in the late Republic, very restrictive ideas about who was “really” Roman
circulated along with hostile comments about “foreigners” taking over.86
As with the Chinese, the Romans had a system of categorization that linked peoples to their
environment and assumed personality characteristics based on the conditions of a group’s native
topography.87 What is different here is that unlike the Chinese, the Romans presumed physical and
racial characteristics to be environmentally determined as well. Note this fragment from Pliny the
Elder describing the characteristics prevalent in the peoples of the southern and northern fringes
before asserting the political dominance of those in the middle regions:
Indeed, in the central part of the earth the regions are fertile in every respect by
virtue of their healthy mixing [of the elements]. The condition of [the
inhabitants’] bodies is moderate with a great temperance even in their
complexion; their rites are mild, their perceptions lucid, their minds productive
and able to comprehend all of nature; to these same peoples belong empires,
which have never belonged to the outermost peoples.88
Here a mild complexion gets linked to a mild temperament, lucidity, and the ability to lead an
empire, all of which are then associated with those located in the “central part” (i.e., Greeks and
Romans), while those on the edges of empire (‘the others”) are assumed not to have the necessary
characteristics for leadership.

C. Suetonius Tranquillus, The Life of Augustus, 40.3.
http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Suetonius/12Caesars/Augustus*.html. Also quoted in Ibid., 2723.
86 Dench, Romulus’ Asylum, 96.
87 Isaac assumes this to have been a practice started by the Graeco-Romans in 5th century BC, however as I mentioned
in chapter 2, the Chinese had long since made this link as well, at least as far back as the Zhou Dynasty. See Isaac
chapter 1.
88 Pliny the Elder, Natural History, 2.78 as quoted in Randolph B. Ford, Rome, China, and the Barbarians:
Ethnographic Traditions and the Transformation of Empires (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 68-9.
85

32

Connected to environment theory was an interest in astronomy and how the stars
determined one’s characteristics and proclivities, a fact that we can see in Manilius’ Astronomica,
which mimics many of Pliny’s observations:
For this reason, the human race is so arranged that its practices and features vary:
nations are fashioned with their own particular complexions: and each stamps
with a character of its own the like nature and anatomy of the human body which
all share. Germany, towering high with tall offspring, is blond: Gaul is tinged to a
less degree with a near-related redness; hardier Spain breeds close-knot, sturdy
limbs. The Father of the City endows the Romans with the features of Mars, and
Venus joining the War-god fashions them with well-proportioned limbs. Quickwitted Greece proclaims in the tanned faces of its peoples the gymnasium and the
manly wrestling-schools. Curly hair about the temples betrays the Syrian. The
Ethiopians stan the world and depict a race of men steeped in darkness; less sunburnt are the natives of India; the land of Egypt, flooded by the Nile, darkens
bodies ore mildly owing to the inundation of its fields: it is a country nearer to us
and its moderate climate imparts a medium tone. 89
Regardless of how certain physical attributes are assigned, it is easy to see here the early
underpinnings of Isaac’s “proto-racism,” with various physical characteristics assigned to groups of
people from a particular region and assumptions made about who was “quick-witted” (the Greeks)
and who was “a race of men steeped in darkness” (the Ethiopians). While it should be
acknowledged that Romans believed most people capable of shucking off their own inferior ways
to embrace Roman-ness and its moral superiority, the categorization of peoples by their race shows
clear echoes of the world that is to come.
Before we get to that world, however, it is important to note that race (and slavery) first had
to pass through religion on its way to modern Western empires, as Rome’s greatest legacy lay not
in its diversity but rather in its turn towards monotheism. This is unfortunate since for most of
Rome’s history, both as a republic and an empire, the Romans were admirably open about religion,
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with polytheism and a respect for local gods and traditions the well-established norm. According to
historian Peter Brown, not only were differentiated ways of worship respected, but it was assumed
that being a polytheist meant glorying “in the fact that the gods did not want unity.”90 Once
Constantine declared himself a Christian in 312, though, the monotheistic religion gained traction,
largely by circulating wealth through a carefully constructed system linking “sin with reparation
through almsgiving,” a practice that helped push Christianity from “low-profile constellations of
tiny groups” into a force to be reckoned with.91 Brown notes that far from being the religion of
slaves and the poor, by the time of Constantine’s conversion, Christianity had built up its wealth,
creating “a new, and self-confident, upper class” in the process.92 After the First Council of Nicaea
in 325, during which Constantine brought all of the bishops together to declare One God the new
order, Christianity found itself in a position of increasing power, not just financially but also as a
burgeoning influence on imperial policy. After centuries of feeling oppressed by the dictates of
polytheists, Christians were in no mood to show tolerance towards “others,” and religious belief
was now treated as a subject for legislation. As a result, having the wrong views on religion was
deemed a ‘thought-crime’ necessitating “discipline.”93 While this was easier to accomplish in the
cities than in the rural areas, the religious revolution spawned by Christianity initiated a social
revolution, with Rome reimagined as “a Christian civilization whose light could shine around the
world” becoming “a reference point for later empires like the Byzantine, Carolingian, Spanish,
Portuguese, and others.” According to Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, it was “this more
restrictive and homogenizing Roman model [that] endured long after the empire fell.”94
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While the Roman Empire may have fallen, Christianity continued its rise, and it was
through a combination of papal decrees, Christian morality, and Roman law that future empires
looking to recreate Rome’s glory days justified their imperial expansion. This was certainly true of
the Spanish and British Empires, particularly as each expanded throughout the Americas. Though
Spain was first to establish colonies in the New World, with the English following a hundred years
later in the early seventeenth century, this century between the two would make all the difference.
With England’s colonial ventures beginning after the Reformation, using papal decrees to justify
dominion was unlikely given England’s recent conversion to Protestantism. For Catholic
Spaniards, though, claims to the New World largely rested on the Alexandrine bulls of 1493-4,
which asserted that in accordance with papal policy, the monarchs of Castile had complete
dominion over any territory discovered on the westward route to Asia, on the condition that the
Spanish Crown assumed responsibility for protecting and evangelizing the indigenous inhabitants.
To “gain favor” with the native populations, the requerimiento, a notorious legal document drawn
up in 1512 explaining Ferdinand and Isabella’s jurisdiction over newly discovered lands, was
routinely read to native populations as a helpful reminder that they would be wise to submit to the
Crown or face the waging of a “just war” against them, an idea borrowed from Rome which
claimed that anyone captured during a ‘just war’ could legally be forced into slavery. Over time,
many Spanish scholars would contest the right of the papacy to dispose of non-Christian lands and
peoples in this way, but ultimately colonial Spaniards were mostly interested in receiving tribute
payments and labor services from indigenous populations as they wanted the easy road to riches
without the trouble of developing large estates.95
While papal decree may have been unavailable to the English, Christianity was not, and this
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combined with Roman law became the justification for English incursion into North America.
Borrowing from the Spanish theologian Francisco de Vitoria, William Crashaw read a sermon
before the Virginia Company in 1610 outlining the Company’s universal rights, including the ‘law
of nations’ (jus gentium), which permitted the freedom of trade and communication and allowed
Christians to “traffic with the heathen.” The law further authorized the English to “take from them
[indigenous] only that they may spare us. First, their superfluous land. Secondly, their superfluous
commodities.” The first regarding (superfluous) land reflects the Roman res nullius argument,
which claimed that “unoccupied land remained the common property of mankind, until put to
use.”96 It was the person who put the land to use that then became the rightful owner. Given this
argument, Queen Elizabeth must have believed herself generous when she declared that in return
for native land, the English would “give to the Savages what they most need. 1. Civility for their
bodies. 2. Christianity for their souls.”97 Res nullius was particularly useful to the English not only
against indigenous populations but also against Spanish claims to land possession through the
papacy and /or the Spanish Crown since the law made possession dependent on occupation and
use. While the Spanish also accepted the law of res nullius, with papal decrees to fall back on they
were rarely in need of other justifications to assert their power. Also, given that the native
population was considerably smaller in North America than in Spanish-controlled Central and
South America, the Roman law was far more useful to the English than to the Spaniards, who had
to manage much larger numbers of indigenous peoples. Regardless, as many have noted, because
women rather than men often worked the land in many indigenous communities, Europeans
frequently assumed (either through misunderstanding or disingenuousness) that native land wasn’t
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being used or cultivated when in fact it was.98
This kind of cultural misunderstanding was rife throughout the New World, particularly
with the English, who, unlike the Spanish, had had limited contact with outside communities when
they arrived on the North American shores. Historian Jane Samson argues this inter-cultural
ignorance was the new face of empire, noting the various differences between the ancient
imperialism of Rome or China and the modern European empires of Spain or England. While there
was certainly migration in ancient empires, there was not the kind of wholesale dispossession of
indigenous populations that was found in modern empires. Also absent was the massive
replacement of indigenous peoples by large numbers of people from outside lands. Perhaps most
significantly, ancient imperialists tended to have some familiarity with the peoples they conquered;
however, this changed with the Europeans who landed in the Americas with no knowledge of the
peoples they were conquering, and even less desire to learn. Obviously, differences in race and
religion played a role in this attitude, but it is also worth reiterating that ancient empires usually
relied on indigenous populations for military and/or administrative positions; consequently, native
peoples were largely incorporated into ancient empires and allowed to live relatively normal lives,
which included the ability to own land. At least theoretically, this was somewhat possible under the
Spanish Empire at various times, but it was entirely impossible in the Americas under the British.
Here we see the early influence of capitalism as modern empires regarded their subjects quite
differently from ancient regimes. In the past, conquered peoples were recognized as adding value
to an empire but in the modern era, natives could easily be replaced by others, like African slaves,
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who might provide a better return on one’s investment.99
Beyond these early harbingers of capitalism, the two imperial powers had their own recent
experiences with conquests elsewhere which they brought with them into the New World. Spain
“discovered” the Americas just at the moment it had finished reconquering Granada from the
Muslims in the Reconquista, thus reuniting the Iberian Peninsula under Ferdinand and Isabella and
pushing the Muslims out of Catholic Spain once and for all. The English, on the other hand, had
been busy invading Wales before conquering Ireland in a series of humiliating take downs
culminating in English and Scottish settlers establishing “plantations” or ‘colonies’ on Irish soil.
Here the res nullius justification was cultivated as the English claimed the semi-nomadic Irish
natives were not putting their land to proper use. Compounding the problem was the fact that the
Irish were considered pagans, prompting Queen Elizabeth to declare it necessary to “bring in that
rude and barbarous nation to civility.”100 Later when the English crossed the Atlantic to the New
World, they brought with them these ready-made arguments developed in Ireland to justify their
seizure and settlement of native people’s land. They also brought men well-trained in displacing
natives and establishing settler colonies.
The Christians of medieval Spain, on the other hand, had lived alongside Jews and Muslims
for centuries before the culmination of the Reconquista, so they had long since acclimated to a
certain toleration for difference (admittedly more out of necessity than conviction). While the
Spanish eventually came to despise the Morisco population, it was impossible for Spaniards to
completely erase their long interaction with ethnically different people whose cultures could not be
so easily disregarded. 101 This history had an obvious effect on how the Spanish Empire viewed the
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native populations it encountered in the Americas and allowed for a level of tolerance for racial
miscegenation that was unthinkable in the British Empire.
Initially, the Spanish set out to create a system of Two Republics in the Americas, one for
the Spanish and the other for Indians. In theory, the Two Republic system encompassed sweeping
legislation from the Crown as well as local colonizers in an attempt to separate native peoples from
other colonial subjects. While it is true that Indians would periodically find themselves herded into
reducciones (similar to Indian reservations), ultimately native populations heavily outnumbered
settlers, so it was impractical to force this kind of separation in any sustained way. 102 The Two
Republic system also proved ineffective and unattractive to a male colonial population short on
Spanish women. Spanish colonizers quickly learned that one easy way to secure power and
economic resources in the New World was to pair up with the daughters of indigenous rulers. 103 In
fact, in 1503 even Ferdinand and Isabella promoted inter-ethnic marriage between Christians and
Indians to create greater understanding between the cultures and to help indoctrinate Indians in the
Holy Catholic Faith. The policy had mixed success, but it remained common and uncontroversial
for intermarriage in the Spanish colonies, though it was not always clear where the children of
these unions (mestizos) fit into society, and over time new intermediate categories such as mulatto,
pardo, zambo, and moreno had to be created to deal with the liminal status of interracial
children.104
After the failed attempt to separate the Spanish and the native populations, a stratified
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pyramid emerged, with Europeans at the top, Black slaves and indios at the bottom, and a group of
ambiguous categories in the middle in which “ancestry, appearance (including dress), occupation
and wealth all influenced social standing” creating a sociedad de castas. In this caste system, racial
status was not fixed, and could change based on indicators such as occupation and wealth in a
classification process that was socially negotiated at the local level with racialized groups playing
“an extremely active role” in the process.105 Borrowing again from the Romans, the Spanish
implemented the concept of vecinidad to apply to members of the community that voluntarily took
on various responsibilities, such as complying with military duties, paying one’s taxes and living
for a sustained period of time in one location. Though this concept underwent changes throughout
the Empire, it largely remained a term applied to foreigners who became recognized members of
the colonial community as opposed to the later term naturaleza, which referred to people of
Spanish blood.106 Needless to say, neither category was open to Jews or Muslims, and in this way,
religion trumped race in terms of inclusivity. While attempts at citizenship for people of color in
the Spanish Empire would have to wait until the nineteenth century, both native populations and
Blacks expected a certain degree of protection as subjects under the Spanish Crown, even if they
didn’t always get it. When the 1812 Constitution of Cadiz finally put citizenship on the table, it was
under ambiguous and complicated circumstances with regards to race among many other factors.107
Nevertheless, there was a fluidity of identity and status under the Spanish Empire that was no doubt
affected by years of living side-by-side with “others” and also mimicked the fluidity of identity that
had been found in Rome.
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It should be noted, however, that other less noble characteristics of the Reconquista (and
Rome) made their way across the Atlantic, in particular, “raiding, plunder, enslavement and
exploitation under the sign of the cross,”108 not to mention, settlement and colonization, for as
Hernán Cortés was fond of saying, “Without settlement there is no good conquest, and if the land is
not conquered, the people will not be converted. Therefore, the maxim of the conqueror must be to
settle.”109 When the early conquistadores arrived in places like Mexico City and Peru, they found
sedentary peoples inhabiting large impressive cities governed by a centralized political structure.
This urban way of life was both familiar and respected by the Spaniards, who believed welldeveloped cities to be the sign of imperium, harkening back to ancient Rome.110 Unfortunately, it
was precisely because these native populations were sedentary and centralized that the Spanish
were able to conquer the Mexica (aka the Aztec) and Inca Empires so easily – simply by cutting off
the head of each civilization and replacing it with another (Spanish) one. 111 The next step was the
extraction of mineral wealth via the exploitation of indigenous labor. To that end, the infamous
encomienda system was established, whereby Spanish encomenderos were given a certain number
of native laborers, who then “worked” for their encomendero, paying him tribute in the forms of
material goods like gold and silver, wood, or food in return for certain protections and privileges. It
should be noted that Indians were not “owned” by encomenderos, so they could not be bought and
sold to others. Moreover, Indians couldn’t be relocated to a different geographical area from their
own. Most notably, encomenderos were only given the right to native labor, not the land. 112 Even
with these protections in place, though, the system often devolved into something uncomfortably
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close to slavery, prompting constant criticism from both the devout as well as the Crown, which
recognized that tributes and labor couldn’t be extracted from natives if they were worked into
exhaustion or worse.113
In 1512 the Crown published the Laws of Burgos, which stipulated that the Indians should
be treated as a free people, which included permitting them to own land and be remunerated for
their labor. This was the first in a series of legislative attempts by the Spanish Crown to protect the
indigenous populations from abuse; however, these attempts were more often than not ignored by
colonizers, and enforcement was largely nonexistent. Still, these early legislative efforts to protect
native peoples were unheard of at the time in other modern empires.114 In the New Laws of 1542,
the encomienda system was finally abolished, leading to the liberation of thousands of native
peoples and a series of bloody revolts against the Crown by angry encomenderos, both of which
paved the way for the importation of African slaves, who were forced to take over the more
exploitative work.115 While the Crown had long frowned upon slavery, the practice was
nevertheless common throughout the New World with Spanish brutality towards slaves well
established. Still, as with Rome, manumission was possible as was the ability for a slave to buy his
or her freedom.116
The English colonies, on the other hand, largely depended on indentured servants as their
main labor source, at least in the early days. Unlike the Spanish south, North American indigenous
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populations were quite small and largely nomadic, neither of which made coercion a likely
strategy. Compounding this was the fact that North American colonies had no mineral resources
such as gold or silver (at least not yet) on which to build their wealth as the Spanish did. Instead of
gold, tobacco became English colonists’ salvation, though tobacco necessitated labor and, more
importantly, land. As the native population had made it clear it was uninterested in providing the
former, the English took the latter on the basis of justifications primed back in Ireland. As for
labor, that arrived in Jamestown on a ship from Africa in 1619, an inauspicious event marking the
beginning of a long and ugly chapter in British, and later American, history.
Like the Spanish, the English were intent on civilizing the native population through
Christianity, but the Puritanism of New England was an exclusive denomination that depended on
conversion for God’s grace, and this, along with the religion’s rigorous social rules, proved even
more demanding than Catholicism, and thus not terribly attractive as a lifestyle. Still, the English
persisted in the beginning, shielding Indians from the corrupting forces of the world by isolating
them into fourteen village communities around Massachusetts called “praying towns.” Considered
a smaller version of the Spanish reducciones, these towns were meant to help with the conversion
process, but mostly they succeeded in herding native populations into living in higher
concentrations and making them easier to control. The Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in
New England opened the Indian College at Harvard in 1655 with the goal of teaching young Indian
children the Gospel, and while the Puritans found some success in ordaining Indian ministers,
overall attempts to Christianize native populations were only mildly more successful than attempts
to force them into labor, and the Harvard College for Indians was demolished in 1693. 117 Once the
English realized the Indians had little interest in Christian ways, and perhaps more importantly,
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once it was revealed that some settlers were more interested in native ways than vice versa, the
English switched focus from conversion to isolation and expulsion. This, along with the already
small number of natives (which would only get smaller thanks to war, disease and famine), along
with some terrifying Indian revolts, gave the English little incentive to fret over the well-being of
indigenous populations, all of which made the res nullius argument that much more convenient. 118
For what could be wrong with the English asserting its rights over “remote, barbarous and heathen
lands, countries, and territories not actually possessed by any Christian prince or people?”119
Certainly, part of the problem was the inability of the English to shake the belief that the
Indians were ultimately too savage for conversion or even civilized society, an idea first cultivated
with the Irish. Unlike the Spanish, who had been forced to live alongside Jews and Muslims, the
English had only ever lived as conquerors amongst “others” (i.e., the Welsh and Irish), and they
had consequently developed a xenophobic attitude towards difference. As noted, Spain was
somewhat flexible in its views on race, though this flexibility decreased considerably with regards
to religion, leading to rules around limpieza de sangre (“purity of blood”), a designation that
referred to not having any Moorish or Jewish traces in one’s ancestry. On the other hand,
seventeenth-century English colonists were fervently anti-Catholic and even less tolerant of racial
difference, and while the former view eventually became somewhat more flexible, the latter only
hardened with time.120 Intermarriage between the English and the Irish had been forbidden back in
1366 by the Statutes of Kilkenny, and the general belief remained that mixed marriages caused the
English partner to degenerate over time. Unsurprisingly then, no mixed marriage is on record as
having occurred between an English setter and an Indian woman in North America before 1676,
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and in 1691, Virginia put a law into effect banning such unions, just in case.121
The eighteenth century saw a marked increase in religious tolerance as more and more nonEnglish peoples such as the Dutch, Germans and Scots made their way to the northern colonies,
and while Protestants were still the most welcome, there were enclaves of Jews and increasing
numbers of Catholics as well, particularly in the mid-Atlantic colonies.122 This is not surprising, for
as historian Gerald Horne has noted, one of the biggest reasons the English started to encourage
immigration from non-English Europeans was to balance out race ratios that had become
increasingly problematic thanks to the burgeoning slave trade, particularly in the southern colonies,
where in places like South Carolina enslaved blacks outnumbered whites and revolts were
increasingly common.123 Revolts were nothing new to the Americas, though, and one of the most
important occurred earlier in 1676 and involved indentured white servants banding together with
enslaved Blacks against the Pamunkey Indians as well as the Virginia elite in what came to be
known as Bacon’s Rebellion. The bonding of poor whites with Blacks so spooked the ruling class
that the Virginia Assembly passed a series of acts over the next thirty-five years, culminating with
the Virginia Slave Codes of 1705, all with the goal of offering unpropertied whites a number of
previously denied benefits in order to prevent any banding together of the races in the future. 124
These laws came on the tail end of a series of other laws designed to disenfranchise non-whites,
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such as Virginia’s 1662 law claiming children born to slave mothers to be slaves in perpetuity
along with several laws banning interracial marriage and denying freedom to Blacks who converted
to Christianity.125
Even with these laws in place, colonists remained on constant guard against backlash from
Blacks and Indians; however, they also became increasingly suspicious of the British Crown,
which found itself exhausted and financially spent after the Seven Years’ War with France and
Spain. As Britain tried to regroup, white settlers found themselves on the receiving end of colonial
policies, a position that put them uncomfortably close to the level of indigenous peoples and
African slaves. Changes made after Britain’s defeat of France and Spain only exacerbated these
feelings as the King’s Proclamation of 1763 prohibited colonial settlers from further encroachment
on Indian land. As a further insult, the Crown allowed French Catholics in Canada to stay and
worship in peace under the umbrella of King George III’s (Protestant) kingdom. By 1772, when the
Somerset case in England declared that slaves could not be forcibly removed from the country,
colonists were starting to question whose side the British were on. As Joyce Chaplin puts it, “The
old arrangements, in which free colonists had had enormous discretion to deal with Indians, rule
over African slaves, and exclude Catholics, were now a matter for reform, with British officials
chiding colonists for their intolerance and inhumanity.”126 It was under these circumstances,
coupled with the better-known issues surrounding taxation to refill the Crown’s spent coffers, that
colonials started to push back. But in order to do this, they would have to recruit the lower orders to
the cause, and since many were Catholic and many more poor and indifferent about who occupied
the leadership position, the soon-to-be revolutionaries turned toward the one thing all of the settlers
had in common: race.
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CHAPTER 4: THE UNITED STATES
Unifying the colonists against the British was not an easy task. Long-standing clashes over
land rights, political access, and religious toleration had created fissures not just between the north
and the south but also between the elites in the east and the less prosperous settlers on the western
frontier. Divisions were so deep that the vicar of Greenwich, England, Andrew Burnaby, remarked,
“such is the difference of character, of manners, of religion, of interest, of the different colonies
that I think…were they left to themselves, there would be a civil war, from one end of the continent
to the other.”127 When Britain tried to impose reforms on the colonies after the Seven Years’ War,
further clashes arose over whether Parliament had the constitutional authority to initiate such
changes. For the men who would become known as “patriots,” the answer was a resounding “no.”
The problem was: how to win others over to their cause.
This was particularly tricky, for many of the colonists took a fair amount of pride in their
English heritage, real or adopted. According to historian Robert Parkinson, once the American
Revolution became the Revolutionary War, the patriots needed to convince others that taking up
arms against the King served a legitimate purpose. To achieve this, the patriots needed “war
stories” to make their cause “common” to others, and for that, they turned to the burgeoning
newspaper industry. 128 Parkinson demonstrates how founders Benjamin Franklin, John Adams,
Thomas Jefferson, and George Washington along with a long list of fellow patriot printers and
publicists like William Bradford (publisher of The Pennsylvania Journal), Peter Withington, and
William Carheart, (both important newspaper distributors) used newspapers as potent weapons of
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mobilization against the British.129 But the stories they wrote and published had little to do with
taxation or abstract concepts regarding rights. Instead, the patriots played on colonists’ fears that
the British were arming slaves and Native Americans against white settlers, and if the colonists
didn’t fight back, they would soon find themselves on the losing end of the master/slave dynamic.
By the time shots were fired at Lexington, the propaganda campaign had already been so effective
that many colonists in nearby Framingham worried that, as one man proclaimed, “The Negroes
were coming to massacre them all,” quite a different take on “The British are coming.” Why the
panic? There had been a story in the Natick paper about a free Black man who had been arrested on
charges of conspiracy, with the explanation that he had “for some Time past been employed in
forming a Plot to destroy the white People,” and it was understood by all who read this who had
“employed” him to do this. The man was later released, and no charges were filed, but this was not
reported. What was also not reported was the fact that several Natick Indians joined the minutemen
that day to beat back the British.130
As the war progressed, the propaganda campaign went into full swing, with stories of Black
and Indian revolts against whites - real, exaggerated, or concocted by patriot leaders - filling the
inside pages of newspapers traveling around the colonies. Part of the effectiveness of the campaign
came from the fact that the British were at times egging Blacks and Native Americans on against
the colonists as a way to squelch the patriot rebellion.131 More significantly, though, Black and
Indian rebellions increased during the War, not only because they were trying to take advantage of
the situation, but because the calls for liberty and freedom were taken quite seriously by many
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beyond white settlers. This was all to the patriots’ advantage, as they successfully promulgated the
idea that Blacks and Indians were acting as proxies for the British, and any story that showed
otherwise (for example, that many Blacks and Indians fought on the side of the patriots against the
British) were actively kept out of the papers. Instead, letters and declarations (both real and fake)
were widely published in order to stir up patriotism, with many like this from “The Declaration of
the Cause and Necessity of Taking Up Arms” playing upon white fears of enslavement:
Schemes have been formed to excite domestic Enemies against us….We will, in
defiance of every Hazard, with unabating Firmness and Perseverance, employ for
the preservation of our Liberties; being with one Mind resolved to die Freemen
rather that to live Slaves. 132
Benjamin Franklin himself came up with a couple of fantastical hoaxes throughout the War,
particularly towards the end when he produced the one-sheet “Supplement to the Boston
Independent Chronicle,” featuring extracts from two “letters.” The first claimed American forces
had discovered eight large packages containing “SCALPS of our unhappy Country-folks, taken in
the three last years by the Senneka Indians from the Inhabitants of New York, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, and Virginia,” reportedly a present to Colonel Haldimand, Governor of Canada, with
instructions to bring the scalps with him to England. The second, addressed to the British
ambassador to the Netherlands, reminded him of the now familiar grievances the colonists had
against the King, and then reiterated the final complaints listed in Jefferson’s Declaration. 133
While years of published accounts like these served the “common cause” well, Parkinson
argues that the list of grievances in Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence also did its part by
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intentionally moving from the least egregious to the most, with the final one being “excited
domestic insurrections amongst us and has endeavoured to bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers
the merciless Indian savages, whose known rule of warfare is an undistinguished destruction of all
ages, sexes, and conditions.” Naming British instigations as the most intolerable of the Crown’s
crimes cast “a long shadow over the idea of who was part of the new republic and who was not.”
For here, all Blacks and Indians (regardless of which side they had fought on) got painted with the
same brush as “mindless, bloodthirsty barbarians too naïve to realize they were being duped by a
tyrant.” More than anything, then, the Declaration of Independence served as a definition of who
was an American, and who wasn’t. As Blacks and Native peoples had successfully been portrayed
as British proxies, they were the “enemy” and were justifiably written out of the burgeoning
Empire. It is important to note the role of race here, though, for the German Hessians had also been
singled out in the patriots’ campaign for being paid assassins for Britain, but at the end of the War,
suddenly they became “passive empty vessels of the king.” This last-minute switch transferred the
blame from the Hessians onto the Crown, thus clearing the way for Germans to become
Americans.134
These “founding stories” published throughout the War persisted long after 1783 in various
articles and texts as well as in histories about the era, many of which used the fabricated (or
“enhanced”) news stories published during the War as their primary sources. As a result, the idea
that Blacks and Native Americans were dangerous proxies for a disgruntled Britain and a constant
threat to the safety and freedom of whites remained a constant fear in people’s minds. In this way,
the patriots’ common cause not only provided whites with a natural rights language to use against
British “tyranny,” it also created an “ethnically constitutive story” for the American people. As
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Parkinson notes, these stories
deepened and developed the negative images of that founding narrative.
Generations of American schoolchildren would learn about merciless savages,
domestic insurrectionists, and British instigators…… The continued retelling of
proxy stories- “new provocations” – exerted further influence over policy after the
war, in part because those images provided ample evidence, dripping with
American patriotism, for the opponents of abolition and fair dealing with Indian
tribes.135
Although many Americans may not have felt comfortable with the ideological
implications, the common cause narrative conflated “white” with “citizen.” Parkinson
argues that the architects of this policy, Jefferson, Adams, Franklin, and Washington did
much of the “crucial labor” to enforce this idea, though not necessarily out of racism but
rather political expediency. 136 Racism or not, the common cause stuck and nonwhites in
the American Empire, particularly Blacks and Native Americans, became permanently
marked as “other.” The repercussions of this can be seen in a petition from a Virginia
county at the end of the War, stating “admission to citizenship is a matter of favour, and
not of right,” further asserting that it was the community that decided who would and
wouldn’t be admitted. No longer universal subjects of a king/emperor, who alone could
make such distinctions, it was now “the (white) people” who defined the boundaries of
“who was a citizen, who was an alien, and who lurked in between.” 137
This question of inclusion also affected when (and if) territories got incorporated into the
Union as states. The Northwest Ordinance of 1787, outlined by Jefferson and written by James
Madison, set the guidelines for how territories became states, but as many historians have noted,
there was nothing in either the Constitution or the Ordinance discussing the absorption or exclusion
of Native peoples. This was because it was assumed that the “inhabitants” of the territories were
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white, for in order to become a state, a territory first had to have “five thousand free male
inhabitants, of full age, in the district;” in other words, five thousand white men. 138 This meant that
territories with large populations of white men, like Illinois, became a state fairly quickly (eleven
months), while territories with problematic race ratios like New Mexico and Oklahoma took much
longer (sixty-two years and over a hundred years, respectively).139
This question of territorial absorption started to become more complicated with the
Mexican War of 1846-1848, in which the United States annexed over a third of Mexico’s national
territory under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and later, the Gadsden Purchase. The U.S. now
found itself ruling over an Indigenous population of Spanish, Mexican and Indian descent, a
situation many found problematic. A newspaper article at the time made clear what was at stake for
(white) Americans, as it reassured readers that the annexation
will incur none of the dangers which have been predicted of admitting a race of
men, differing from us in language, religion, descent, laws, manners, and social
condition to an equal participation in the benefits and responsibilities of free
government [because the region was] comparatively unsettled [and] by the time it
has a population enough to send a member to Congress [it] will be thoroughly
Americanized. So all of the forebodings concerning the appearance in the Senate
or House of Representatives of a thorough-bred Mexican or half-breed Mexican
will be dissipated.140
While some in Congress had wanted to take more of Mexico’s territory, Senator John C. Calhoun
from South Carolina put forth what would become the anti-imperialist view, “We have never
dreamt of incorporating into the Union any but the Caucasian race – the free white race…Are we to
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associate with ourselves, as equals, companions, and fellow-citizens, the Indians and mixed races
of Mexico?”141 Others like William Walker thought the expansion of U.S. territory would allow for
the expansion slavery, and he pushed south into Nicaragua, instigating a coup and then briefly
acting as “president” before being executed in 1860, not for trying to expand slavery, but rather for
trying to incorporate more Latin Americans into the Union. In Daniel Immewahr’s view, what
started to emerge in this combination of a republican commitment to equality and an equally strong
commitment to white supremacy was “a rapidly expanding empire of settlers that fed on land but
avoided incorporating people.”142 Regardless, the small number of Mexicans absorbed into the
Empire from the War seemed to pose little threat to whites, so, unlike Native Americans or Blacks,
Mexicans were granted citizenship, though Mexican Indians and Mexican women lost their prior
property rights in the process.143 Other former inhabitants of the Spanish Empire would not fare so
well.
Questions regarding the inclusion of conquered territories into the Union came up again
with the Spanish-American War of 1898, which ended with the annexation of Cuba, Puerto Rico,
Guam, and the Philippines.144 By now, few wanted the responsibility for ruling over these
territories, let alone incorporating their densely populated nonwhite residents under the American
umbrella. President McKinley fretted over what to do, concluding that giving the territories back
made America look weak in a world of imperial powers; if America wanted to play empire, it had
to act accordingly. Still, the question remained of what to do with all of the newly acquired
“Americans.” Luckily the Supreme Court settled this dilemma in a series of nine cases collectively
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known as the Insular Cases.
The result of a string of challenges to U.S. tariffs mostly in Puerto Rico, the Insular Cases
questioned whether Congress had the right to impose tariffs on trade with U.S. territories consistent
with the Constitution’s uniformity clause. In short, if Puerto Rico was “domestic,” then it was
subject to the Constitution and the tariffs were unconstitutional, but if it was “foreign,” then the
tariffs could stand. Largely forgotten today, the Insular Cases were hotly debated in the press in
1901. In the end, it was determined that the U.S. was only comprised of its member states, and thus
in the absence of Congress’s express extension, the Constitution did not apply to Puerto Rico or
any of the other U.S. territories. Justice Henry Brown claimed, “It is doubtful if Congress would
ever assent to the annexation of territory upon the condition that its inhabitants, however, foreign
they may be to our habits, traditions, and modes of life, shall become at once citizens of the U.S,”
adding that bestowing the full “blessings of a free government under the Constitution” on these
alien races would be “fatal” to the American Empire. 145 In other words, territories were no longer
states in waiting, but rather sites of colonialism, subject to the dictates of Congress.
According to historian Bartholomew Sparrow, these cases lie forgotten today, even though
the rulings still stand - Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, and the U.S. Virgin Islands all
remain “unincorporated territories” in which the U.S. government has sovereignty over the
inhabitants, even if they are U.S. citizens. This lack of representation, Sparrow argues, became
entrenched with the decisions in the Insular Cases, even though “its legacy can be traced back to
the founding and to the origins of the U.S. territorial system.” He suggests that since the
Constitution is nearly silent on the subject of territorial expansion, students of U.S. political theory
and history don’t see these cases. However, he also reveals that the most commonly assigned text
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on the judiciary, The American Supreme Court by Robert McCloskey, doesn’t mention the cases
and neither do most of the casebooks that survey U.S. Constitutional law, suggesting something
else might be at play in this forgetting.146
This legalization of exclusivity can be found throughout American history,
particularly with the laws surrounding American citizenship and immigration. From the
beginning, the Naturalization Act of 1790, limiting naturalization to a “free white
person….of good character,” announced the American Empire as an empire for whites
only. It wasn’t until 1868 and a bloody Civil War, that the Fourteenth Amendment
granted citizenship to people born within the United States, irrespective of race.
However, untaxed Native Americans (anyone living on a reservation – i.e., the majority
of Indians) weren’t included, and then five years later with the Naturalization Act of
1870, Chinese people were excluded from citizenship altogether. This ban on Chinese
naturalization soon extended to quotas and across-the-board bans on Chinese
immigration, starting with the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882. With the Immigration Act
of 1917, Asians in general were barred from immigrating to the U.S. (with the exception
of Filipinos, who were within U.S. dominion from 1898 to 1946). Meanwhile, the
Immigration Act of 1924 established a hierarchy of racial preference for immigrants, with
racial identities deemed permanent and unchangeable at the bottom (non-Europeans) and
nationality-based identities considered more capable of assimilation (Europeans) at the
top. According to Christina Gerken, the Immigration Act of 1924 worked hand in hand
with the Supreme Court decisions Ozawa vs. United States and United States v. Thind to
racialize Asians, helping to define them as “not white and thus permanently foreign.”147
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Meanwhile, preference continued to be given to immigrants from northwestern Europe
(i.e., Germany and Britain), and while less desirable immigrants from southern European
countries like Italy faced discrimination, they were never denied citizenship rights.
Ironically, 1924 was also the year Native Americans finally gained citizenship. It wasn’t
until 1943, though, that the ban on Chinese naturalization was lifted, with the ban on
other Asians finally lifted in 1952.
Racial quotas continued to be used until 1965, but by then, new ways of restricting who
could immigrate into the country had emerged, including bans on “sexual deviants” (aka
homosexuals), communists, and more recently, Muslims. In fact, according to political scientist
Rogers M. Smith, “when restrictions on voting rights, naturalization, and immigration are taken
into account, it turns out that for over 80 percent of U.S. history, American laws declared most
people in the world legally ineligible to become full U.S. citizens solely based on their race,
original nationality, or gender.” As for those living in the United States, “for at least two-thirds of
American history, the majority of the domestic adult population was also ineligible for full
citizenship for the same reasons,” adding that “those racial, ethnic, and gender restrictions were
blatant, not latent,” and paid little attention to how “liberal, republican or faithful to other
American values” a person was.148 This was in sharp contrast to the usual dictates of empire, which
generally aimed for inclusivity and a fair amount of opportunity for “others” who proved loyal to
an empire and its values. In America, however, loyalty has often been overshadowed by race. An
example of this is the well-known case of the Cherokee Indians, who, after submitting themselves
to a process of conversion to both Christianity and a European system of government, still found
themselves pushed off their land in the southeast and forced onto the notorious Trail of Tears.
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While America has long demanded assimilation of its “others,” its laws have often presupposed
that such assimilation was not possible, making exclusion or subordinate status the only options.
Another difference between America and the other empires examined here has been
America’s longstanding practice of cutting the Native population out of the imperial umbrella
altogether. As discussed, most empires have realized the importance of maintaining working
relations with Indigenous populations, however, in America the process of disenfranchising Native
American peoples began soon after declaring Independence. In 1791, the Indian Trade and
Intercourse Acts announced Indians were separate peoples that only the federal government had the
legal right to deal with. By 1795, Indians had been reduced to subjects/children under a
paternalistic American government with the Treaty of Grenville. In 1823, the Supreme Court
weighed in, declaring Native Americas to be “an inferior race of people, without the privileges of
citizens and under the perpetual protection and pupilage of the government,” with Chief Justice
John Marshall later describing Indians as “domestic dependent nations” and “a ward to” the U.S. In
1830, President Andrew Jackson signed the Indian Removal Act into law, and this led to the forced
removal (many say “genocide”) of thousands of Indians from their ancestral lands. The Indian
Appropriations Act of 1851 introduced the Indian Reservation system, which created a zone of
exclusion for Indigenous peoples, shutting them out of both the polity and the nation itself and
often isolating them from other Indian nations. Today the reservations remain zones of exclusion
and poverty with high rates of alcoholism and suicide.149
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Still, many argue that America’s policies towards “others” have generally been on an
upward trajectory from our foundations. While there is no doubt that important steps have been
made, particularly to better incorporate Asians and white “ethnics” (Italians, Irish and Jews),
Indians, Blacks, and Latinx still face high levels of exclusion in the form of poverty and low
standards of well-being, no doubt the result of the early mythologies set in place during the
Revolution and the Mexican-American War. Moreover, it should be acknowledged that many of
the advances that have occurred have come about through a fair amount of violence and continual
backsliding. Using African Americans as an example, Rogers Smith points out that whatever
progress Blacks had made in the early eighteenth century was wiped out by the Dred Scott decision
in 1857, which declared, “A free negro of the African race…is not a “citizen” within the meaning
of the Constitution of the United States.”150 A brutal Civil War shifted power for a moment, with
the Reconstruction amendments (the 13th, 14th and 15th amendments) setting out to end slavery,
grant citizenship to those born in the U.S., and allow Black men the right to vote. But these
advances soon met the Black codes, Jim Crow, the KKK and Plessy v. Ferguson, all of which
reinstated restrictions on voting, constitutionalized segregation, and allowed random violence
against Blacks to remain a terrifying daily reality. Brown v. The Board of Education in 1954 and
the Civil Rights movement in the 1960s ended legalized segregation and reinforced protections
against discrimination based on race (The Civil Rights Act) as well as against voter discrimination
(The Voting Rights Act).151 Two decades later, however, Blacks found themselves incarcerated at
higher rates than any other race per capita in America, victims of a prison industrial complex that
often permanently robbed them of their voting rights and used them as free labor while making

Transcript of Dred Scott v. Sanford (1857), Our Documents.gov, Retrieved 8-14-20.
https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=29&page=transcript. And Smith, 16.
151 The Voting Rights Act was all but revoked by the Supreme Court in 2013.
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gainful employment after prison nearly impossible.152 America’s first Black president in 2008 was
followed in 2016 by a president that used common cause race baiting (this time against Mexicans
and Muslims) to reestablish the myth of white supremacy. Decades of bank redlining in nonwhite
neighborhoods to stymie home and business ownership along with chronic police violence towards
minority communities have aided in the continued exclusion of Blacks and Latinx from economic
and physical security, prompting the current round of protests against police brutality with the
Black Lives Matter Movement. 153
While an argument can be made that serious setbacks aside, “the other” in American society
has still largely managed to increase its inclusion in the Empire over time, a look at America’s
overall place in the historiography of empire reveals a less sanguine view. Compared to the vast
number of ethnicities, religions, and languages enveloped in the Eastern empires, and how empires
like the Mongols allowed for more inclusivity than the Chinese, and the Mughals even more than
the Mongols, the Roman Empire and its descendants have demonstrated an opposite trajectory. For
the Romans, with all of their formidable flaws, largely created an inclusive empire while the
Spanish and the British became increasingly less inclusive of “others” in Rome’s aftermath.
Building upon British legislation against racial mixing, the American Empire could by many
counts be considered the least inclusive of the empires, opening its doors to “others” only when
pushed by expediency or violence. Given the difference between the inclusive mythologies

Even with recent declines in the prison population, Blacks still comprise the highest percentage of inmates with
33% of the prisoners (while comprising only 12% of the general population). Hispanics comprise 23% of the prison
population (and 16% of the general population), while whites comprise 30% of prisoners (but 63% of the general
population). See “Blacks, Hispanics Make Up Larger Shares of Prisoners than of U.S. Population,” Pew Research
Center, May 6, 2020. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/05/06/share-of-black-white-hispanic-americans-inprison-2018-vs-2006/ft_20-05-05_imprisonmentrates_2a/
153 For a good overview of segregationist government policies like redlining, see Richard Rothstein, The Color of Law:
A Forgotten History of How Our Government Segregated America (New York: Liveright Publishing, 2017). Also, note
that the overwhelming number of people dying from Covid 19 in the U.S. are people of color, who are often poor and
lack access to quality health care – yet another sign of their exclusion. See Tiffany Ford, Sarah Reber, and Richard V.
Reeves, “Race Gaps in Covid 19 Cases,” Brookings Institute 6-16-20, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/upfront/2020/06/16/race-gaps-in-covid-19-deaths-are-even-bigger-than-they-appear/.
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surrounding “others” promulgated in the Eastern empires (as well as in the Roman Empire), and
the expressly exclusive mythologies about Blacks and Indians (and later Mexicans) set in motion
with the common cause in the U.S., it isn’t a surprise that the American Empire has not been able
to overcome its foundational mythologies to embrace diversity beyond political utility.
America’s inability to view “the other” as a source of strength, as so many other empires
have, has consequences not only for the inhabitants under the American umbrella, but also for the
sustainability of the umbrella itself. As was noted, many of the books and articles announcing the
American Empire’s decline focus on the typical characteristics often associated with other imperial
declines: a decadent upper class, military overreach, unsustainable levels of inequality, moral rot,
etc. However, I would like to suggest that while America shares all of these characteristics of
imperial decline, what is unique about America is precisely its inability to see diversity as an
advantage, and in excluding so many from its protections as the default position, the center seems
unlikely to hold.154 Certainly, every empire has its own approach to dealing with cultural
differences, some better than others, but some kind of diversity has been key for imperial
durability. Treating difference as something that can be overcome or eradicated has produced few
imperial success stories. America’s choice early on to construct its foundations on the back of
white male superiority continues to prove hard to dismantle without bringing down everything with
it. With the U.S. on track to becoming minority white in 2045, it appears that demographics more
than anything else will prove to be the Empire’s undoing.155 Let us hope this is the lesson heeded
by the empires that follow.
Eduardo Porter argues the real reason the U.S. lacks a basic social safety net that other industrialized nations have is
because it is unwilling to extend these “privileges” to all – meaning to nonwhites. See Eduardo Porter, “Why America
Will Never Get Medicare for All,” New York Times, March 14, 2020. Accessed March 15, 2020.
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/14/sunday-review/medicare-for-all-america-racism.html
155 See William H. Fey, “The U.S. Will Become ‘Minority White’ in 2045, Census Projects,” Brookings Institute,
March 14, 2018. Accessed August 10, 2020. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2018/03/14/the-us-willbecome-minority-white-in-2045-census-projects/
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